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    Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines
Louis Kaplow*
Abstract
The recently issued revision of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, like its
predecessors and mirrored by similar guidelines throughout the world, devotes substantial
attention to the market definition process and the implications of market shares in the market that
is selected.  Nevertheless, some controversy concerning the revised Guidelines questions their
increased openness toward more direct, economically based methods of predicting the
competitive effects of mergers.  This article suggests that, as a matter of economic logic, the
Guidelines revision can only be criticized for its timidity.  Indeed, economic principles
unambiguously favor elimination of the market definition process altogether.  Accordingly, the
2010 revision is best viewed as a moderate, incremental, pragmatic step toward rationality, its
caution being plausible only because of legal systems’ resistance to sharp change.
Forthcoming, Review of Industrial Organization
1Dennis Carlton (2010, p. 619) states: “The [U.S.] Horizontal Merger Guidelines . . . have had an enormous
influence not just on how U.S. antitrust agencies conduct merger policy but also on how courts and antitrust agencies
throughout the world make decisions about the antitrust consequences of mergers.”  Readers of the EU’s Guidelines
on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers (2004), for example, will note striking similarities.
2See also DG Competition Discussion Paper (2005, ¶14), on the European competition authority’s use of
the SSNIP test for market definition, especially in merger cases, and the Commission Notice on the Definition of
Relevant Markets (1997, ¶¶15–17).
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1  Introduction
In 2010, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice completed a
process to revise their joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines, prior versions of which have been
emulated by competition regimes throughout the world and also have had a significant influence
on U.S. courts and legal practice, including the work of economic experts on particular cases.1 
The revised Guidelines reflect an incremental approach, perhaps in part reflecting actual,
updated views regarding best practices but also to an unknown extent displaying pragmatic
political judgment in light of the legal system’s reluctance to embrace what it would regard as
radical change.
Central to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, old and new, are a method for defining
markets and a statement of the implications of market shares in the markets so defined. 
Regarding the former, the now famous technique, followed closely in other jurisdictions as well,
is as follows:
The hypothetical monopolist test requires that a product market contain enough
substitute products so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of market
power significantly exceeding that existing absent the merger.  Specifically, the
test requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm . . . that was the only
present and future seller of those products (“hypothetical monopolist”) likely
would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price
(“SSNIP”) on at least one product in the market . . . .  (U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines 2010 [hereinafter HMG], §4.1.1.)2
In basic settings, one begins with a narrow, homogeneous goods market and asks whether a
hypothetical monopolist thereof would find it profitable to raise price above the preexisting level
by at least 5% (HMG, §4.1.2).  If so, that is deemed to be the relevant market.  If not, one
expands the market by adding the nearest substitutes and repeats the test.  If it is passed, the
process is complete and that redefined market is selected.  If not, the process is repeated until the
test is satisfied
Once the market is thereby defined, one computes the postmerger Herfindahl-Hirschman
3For a range of references supportive of this familiar point, see Kaplow (2010, p. 439 n. 2).
4“The Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition.  Some of the analytical tools used by the
Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition, although evaluation of competitive
alternatives available to customers is always necessary at some point in the analysis.”  HMG §4.  “Diagnosing
unilateral price effects based on the value of diverted sales need not rely on market definition or the calculation of
market shares and concentration.”  HMG §6.1.
5For example, the Guidelines indicate that one purpose is to “assist the courts in developing an appropriate
framework for interpreting and applying the antitrust laws in the horizontal merger context” (HMG §1).  In principle
and to some extent in practice, U.S. courts are more open to alternatives to market definition than most
commentators ordinarily suppose.  See Kaplow (2010, §VI.E).
6See the references below, in note 27.
7See, for example, Carlton (2010).
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Index (HHI) in that market, and also the increase in the HHI due to the merger, in order to
determine the presumptive level of danger.  For example: “Mergers resulting in highly
concentrated markets [with an HHI above 2500] that involve an increase in the HHI of more than
200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”  (HMG, §5.3.)  The 2010
Guidelines reflect some change in this regard; specifically, the targets have been raised
(previously this high-danger zone began at an HHI of 1800 and only required an increase of
100).  In addition, however much the U.S. agencies are in fact influenced by market shares or
HHIs, it seems clear that courts place significant weight on market definition and resulting
market shares.3
One of the most noted changes in the 2010 revision is that a number of statements
indicate the agencies’ inclination to embrace alternative, more direct economic methods for
predicting the competitive effects of mergers, whether using merger simulations or critical loss
analysis.  (E.g., HMG, §§4.1.3, 6.1.)  Furthermore, there are suggestions that these alternatives
may sometimes supplant market definition.4  To a significant extent, these statements may
merely reflect what has come to be standard operating procedure.  However, inclusion in the
Guidelines seems designed to signal both greater internal use of market definition alternatives in
the future and a desire to induce the courts to be more open to such methods.5
This set of changes regarding market definition, in turn, has generated some criticism. 
During the revision process, commentators suggested that the greater willingness to substitute
more direct methods for the market definition process may be going too far—or perhaps the
concern is not that the revision in fact goes too far but that it may lead to further shifts that would
exceed the bounds of sound economic judgment.6  In addition, some particular techniques, such
as Farrell and Shapiro’s (2010) method of assessing the presence of upward pricing pressure in
differentiated products mergers, have been criticized as being untested and too difficult to
employ by comparison to more traditional market definition methods.7  It is unclear at this point,
however, whether the overall sense of the competition policy community is that the move made
by the 2010 Guidelines is sound or somewhat excessive.
The thesis of this article is that the changes with regard to market definition have not, in
principle, gone nearly far enough.  As a matter of sound economics, the market
definition—really, redefinition—process should never be employed.  As a consequence, it makes
sense not simply to increase reliance on alternatives here and there, when particularly good data
8The language in the text here and throughout largely speaks in terms of product market definition.  For the
most part, similar analysis is applicable to geographic market definition.
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of the right kind happens to be available, but to use them across the board.  Related, if the market
definition process is indeed bankrupt, arguments that various alternatives are inferior to existing
techniques carry a very high burden of proof.  The analysis here does not endorse any particular
method of assessing the competitive impacts of horizontal mergers, offer reasons why one or
another may be superior in particular settings, or suggest that formal economic techniques are
usually superior to more informal methods, such as predicting competitive effects based on the
views of industry players (notably, large sophisticated purchasers) or inferences from the
merging firms’ internal documents.  Instead, the claim is that any and all evidence should focus
explicitly on the determinants of competitive effects and eschew the attempt to define a relevant
market.
Section 2 critiques the general logic of the market definition process, drawing on Kaplow
(2010).  First, it argues that it is counterproductive to redefine markets because there does not
exist any way to interpret market shares in such markets—which, after all, was the whole point. 
There do exist ways to interpret market shares in homogeneous goods markets under certain
assumptions; redefined markets bring in substitutes, creating heterogeneous goods markets, and
there is no economic method of interpreting shares in such markets.8
Second, there is no meaningful way to choose which is the better (relevant) market
without assuming that one already has in hand a best estimate of market power, however good or
bad it might be; but this renders the market definition exercise pointless—since the whole
purpose is to make market power inferences.  In saying that one market definition is superior to
another, one is essentially asserting that the error involved in choosing the former is less than
that associated with the latter.  But to measure either error, one needs to determine the difference
between the market power one would infer in the market and the value of one’s best estimate of
market power.  However, if we have the latter, we should be done.  Hence, choosing between
markets is pointless.  Unfortunately, it is usually worse because, once we have chosen a market,
we derive our market power inference in part from the choice we have just made, and such
inference is, by definition, different from our best estimate.  (Our just-mentioned measure of the
error is, after all, the difference between this inference and our best estimate.)  Accordingly, we
are employing a market power measure that is, by the nature of the process, necessarily worse
than our best estimate.  This approach is always a mistake, and if the mistake is sufficiently
large, it may tip the outcome—whether or not to challenge a merger—thereby transforming the
economic mismeasurement into an inferior legal decision.
Section 3 applies and extends the analysis to the specific method employed in the U.S.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines—the hypothetical monopolist test—and shows that it by nature
leads to anomalous results.  Put another way, it generates determinacy at the expense of
coherence.  Of course, given the analysis in section 2, it could not be otherwise.  Section 3 also
considers three basic merger settings—concerns with coordinated effects, and cases with
unilateral effects, in both homogeneous and differentiated products industries—and explains
how, on reflection, the market definition process (and, specifically, the hypothetical monopolist
9This is not to say that use of a market metaphor might not sometimes be helpful.  Nor is it suggested that
judgments never have to be made, say, about how widely to collect data (on how broad a range of products) for
purposes of estimating a demand system.  Such uses are qualitatively different from the definition of a relevant
market for purposes of making a market power inference from the shares therein.
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test) is useless, or worse, in each instance.
In summary, the market definition process is fundamentally defective, so much so as to
render it inappropriate in all settings.  The hypothetical monopolist test cannot, a priori, solve
this problem, and in practice it often produces arbitrary results.  Fortunately, the hypothetical
monopolist test in particular and market definition in general are wholly unnecessary in the
assessment of the competitive effects of horizontal mergers—or in other competition policy
settings, for that matter.9  For economists, the message is to continue or accelerate work on other
ways of determining market power.  For competition authorities and courts, the lesson is to be
open to alternatives, whether proffered by the government or by merging parties, and to
encourage rather than resist sound analysis whenever it is offered.
2 Bankruptcy of the Market Definition / Market Share Paradigm
2.1 The Impossibility of Market Share Inferences in Redefined Markets
Under the familiar market definition / market share paradigm, one first defines the
relevant market and then uses market shares in that market to make market power inferences. 
This subsection focuses on the second element, market share inferences (deferring the first
element to subsection 2.2).  In addressing this question, one should begin at the beginning:  How
is it that market shares bear on market power?
This question, on its surface, is perplexing because market power is not defined by
market shares.  Rather, market power is ordinarily defined by the ability of firms to profitably
elevate price (P) above a competitive level, taken to involve price equal to marginal cost (MC). 
For example, the Lerner index (L) is the price minus the marginal cost (at the prevailing level of
output), which difference is divided by the price.  Hence, if one wishes to measure market
power, it would seem that one would be estimating price and marginal cost.
Although the measurement of price is not without problems (particularly with product
differentiation and when products are bundled with each other or with services), measurement of
marginal cost is notoriously difficult in many settings, especially due to the need to determine
which costs are variable in the pertinent time frame and the problem of allocating joint costs. 
Accordingly, economists have often sought other means of inferring market power.
An important approach relies on firms’ profit maximization calculus, from which one can
deduce that static maximization implies the equation of the Lerner index with the inverse of (the
absolute value of) the firm’s elasticity of demand.  Hence, an approach toward market power
assessment is to measure firms’ elasticities of demand.  This endeavor can also be daunting.
10See, for example, Stigler (1940), Landes and Posner (1981), and Kaplow and Shapiro (2007).
11The choice of whether to calculate the share in terms of units sold, value, or some other criterion is more
consequential since we are no longer in a homogeneous goods market.  The argument in the text sets this and other
problems to the side.
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Moving yet a step further from our definition of market power, it is common to employ a
model in which a dominant firm sells a homogeneous good, subject to the constraint of demand
substitution and the supply response of a competitive fringe.  In this model, the market power
relationship is given by the following familiar expression:10
L P MC
P
S
Sf d r
     
1
1  ( ) .
In this formula, the firm’s elasticity of demand is gf = (dQ/dP)(P/Q), where Q denotes the
quantity of the firm’s output; the market elasticity of demand is gd = (dX/dP)(P/X), where X
denotes total market demand; and the rivals’ collective elasticity of supply is gr = (dY/dP)(P/Y),
where Y denotes rivals’ total supply.  Finally, S is the dominant firm’s market share and hence
1!S indicates rivals’ aggregate share.
We now have an explicit indication of the functional relationship between a firm’s
market share and its market power—although, as will be elaborated momentarily, this
relationship holds only under certain assumptions, most importantly for present purposes, the
assumption of a homogeneous goods market.  In this formula, a higher share indeed indicates
greater market power.  When a dominant firm’s share is larger, it benefits more from the price
elevation that results from its reduction in output.  Moreover, a higher dominant firm share
implies a lower share for rivals and hence a lesser impact of a given rivals’ elasticity of supply.
This formula has some further properties that are well known but do not always seem to
be appreciated.  Notably, the formula works regardless of how many demand substitutes exist or
how strong those substitutes are.  These factors determine the overall market elasticity of
demand: the market elasticity equals one plus the revenue-weighted sum of all cross-elasticities. 
And this market elasticity, capturing all sources and strengths of demand substitution, appears in
our formula.  Hence, the formula properly depicts market power regardless of the particulars of
demand substitution.  It follows immediately that there is no point whatsoever in redefining
markets to capture the influence of substitutes.
The situation, however, is worse with regard to market redefinition.  Suppose, as is
commonly done, that one does decide to redefine the market, supplementing our original
homogeneous goods market with markets for one or more close substitutes.  Moreover, assume
that this market redefinition is appropriate under whatever criterion one chooses, such as the
U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test, and that the result is indeed
the sought-after relevant market.  In this redefined market, we can compute the dominant firm’s
new, reduced market share.11  But what do we do with that share?  That is, what formula are we
to use to assess the firm’s market power in this expanded market?
We have not merely, as they say, jumped out of the frying pan into the fire.  We have
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started in a situation in which a valid market power inference may be drawn—regardless of the
nature of demand situation—and moved to one in which we can make no inference whatsoever. 
The problem is that there exists no valid economic way to infer the firm’s market power in this
broader market, using its market share in that market or otherwise.
We cannot simply apply our old formula because it is only valid in a homogeneous goods
market—such was assumed in the profit-maximizing derivations that underlie it.  If we
nevertheless attempt to apply the formula, what are we to insert for the elasticity of market
demand and of rivals’ supply?  We cannot use the initial elasticities, for they apply to the
narrower, homogeneous goods market.  So, what is the market elasticity of demand for the
combined market?  One could ask, as under the hypothetical monopolist test, how many sales a
firm that raised price in both markets would lose to substitutes outside the combined market, but
that elasticity answers the wrong question (on which more in section 3).  That is, we want to
know the dominant firm’s market power—or, in other settings, perhaps the market power of
postmerger firms that, say, now coordinate on price in the initial market.
There is, it turns out, a unique number we can insert for the market elasticity of demand
in this combined market that gives us the right market power answer (assuming that we also
handle rivals’ supply elasticity properly, a subject considered momentarily).  To see what this
elasticity is, assume for simplicity that rivals’ supply elasticity is zero.  In that case, the market
elasticity that works is our original market elasticity—computed in the narrower, homogeneous
goods market—multiplied by the ratio of the new, lower share to the former, higher share.  When
the new, lower share is divided by that scaled-down market elasticity, as commanded by our
formula, the result is (by construction) equal to the original market share divided by our original
market elasticity.  And, moreover, we know that this latter fraction does properly indicate market
power, since our formula works for the narrower, homogeneous goods market.  Clearly, any
other market elasticity we insert will give the wrong answer.
This fact establishes the following proposition:  The only way to apply our formula in the
broader, redefined market to yield the correct market power inference is to insert a particular,
phantom market elasticity of demand that is determined in such as way as to undo entirely the
effect of the market redefinition.  In other words, the only way to make a valid market power
inference in the redefined market is to ignore this supposedly relevant market and go back to
where we began.
It should be immediately apparent that the same logic applies with regard to rivals’
elasticity of supply.  There is no obvious definition of this concept for our broader, redefined
market.  We could ask what is the weighted average response across all of the
(nonhomogeneous) products when the price of all is elevated by the same proportion, but that
again would be answering the wrong question.  To determine the right phantom rivals’ supply
elasticity to insert into our formula, we can assume that the market elasticity of demand is zero
and then scale down our original supply elasticity for the homogeneous goods market so that,
when inserted into the formula with the new, lower market share, we get the same answer as we
obtained in our original, homogeneous goods market.  This answer again is unique, and it
likewise undoes the market redefinition.  Finally, when neither elasticity is in fact zero, it should
12See Kaplow (2010, pp.  454–458).
13See Landes and Posner’s (1981) important article and the discussions in responses by Schmalensee (1982)
and Kaplow (1982).  Schmalensee in particular criticizes Landes and Posner’s attempts to employ (as is) the formula
relating market shares to market power in redefined, heterogeneous goods markets as if the formula were still valid.
14See, for example, Fisher (1987) and Kaplow and Shapiro (2007).  Werden (1983, p. 526) has noted that
“[e]conomic theory does not require the delineation of markets, and most economists would not know how to begin
to delineate one,” but he goes on to state that the U.S. Merger “Guidelines employ the concept of an ‘antitrust
market,’ a market delineated for the sole purpose of antitrust analysis.”
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be clear that making both of these adjustments will work in all cases.12
What we have learned is that the only valid way to make market power inferences from
market shares in redefined, nonhomogeneous goods markets is to undo the market redefinition. 
This conclusion raises the question of what we—economists, agencies, courts, and others—have
been doing all along in the myriad instances in which we have redefined markets and purported
to make inferences from market shares in the combined markets.  This question has sometimes
been addressed, and occasionally suggestions have been made that one might somehow interpret
market shares in broadened markets so as to yield the same answers as one would obtain from
the higher market shares in narrower markets.13  And some commentators have observed that
there is no such thing as a “relevant market” in industrial organization textbooks, and no
economics literature standing behind inferences of market power from market shares therein.14 
So it is indeed a wonder how the present state of affairs arose and has persisted until now,
especially in economists’ writing and in their work in government agencies and as testifying
experts.
2.2 The Impossibility of Choosing the Best Market without Already Having a Best Estimate of
Market Power
As just noted, the market definition / market share paradigm proceeds in two steps:
defining a relevant market and then making market power inferences from market shares in that
market.  The preceding subsection explains how the second step is impossible, short of undoing
any market redefinition.  This subsection demonstrates that the first step is likewise impossible,
in this instance without already having in hand one’s best estimate of market power—thereby
undermining the raison d’être of the paradigm, which is to enable a market power inference. 
Moreover, using the market power inference from the chosen, relevant market discards
information contained in one’s best estimate and, as a result, produces a worse inference.
To begin, it is necessary to state what one means by the relevant market.  That is, in
choosing between (say, for simplicity) two candidate markets, one needs a criterion for which
market definition is better.  Remarkably, it is almost impossible to find explicit statements of
what this criterion might be—remarkable since economists, agencies, courts, and others have
been purporting routinely to choose best markets for over half a century, and in the process
presenting, engaging, and resolving disputes about which market definition is best in myriad
particular cases.  How can one conduct such debates and reach conclusions without a decision-
making standard?
15It should be obvious that the present analysis does not depend on a symmetric loss function that only
depends on the magnitude of the error and not its sign, on whether the loss function is linear, on how one takes into
account uncertainty in the best estimate, and so forth.
16Moreover, it must be that it was obtained without first choosing the relevant market, for if it were not, we
would have an entirely circular process.
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The discussion here will employ the criterion that the best market is that which results in
the most accurate market power inference.  (As will be discussed in section 3, the hypothetical
monopolist test differs and, on that account, should be viewed as inferior.)  So, suppose that we
are choosing between a narrower market, N, and a broader market, B, and we wish to know
which choice is superior.  As background, we should imagine that there may have been other
candidate markets as well, and we have somehow managed to narrow our list to these two
choices.  Moreover, suppose that we believe that the truth lies somewhere in between; that is,
market power is less than we would infer from the larger market share in the narrower market N
and more than we would infer from the smaller market share in the broader market B.  This
setting abstracts from how the narrowing decisions were made, and we may presume that they
used the same criterion that will now be scrutinized.  And the choice between N and B is only
interesting if the truth lies somewhere in between, for otherwise it will be obvious which of the
two markets to choose, and the real question would be the choice between that market and one
on the other side of the truth.  Of course, this setting is quite familiar; once issues have narrowed
in a government agency’s analysis of a merger, or in a legal dispute in court, ultimately the
disagreement usually comes down to precisely such a choice.
A preliminary problem with the choice has already been evaded in this setup, for it is
supposed that some market power inference will be made in market N and in market B and,
moreover, that these inferences will differ, for otherwise the choice would be moot.  But, given
the analysis in subsection 2.1, such inferences are infeasible—that is, unless in each case one is
in or reverts to the homogeneous goods market, in which event market definition would be
unnecessary.  Suppose that, somehow, this problem has been overcome, and we indeed have
some distinct market power inference associated with each of our two choices.
The next step is to determine which choice results in the most accurate inference of
market power, which is to say, the smallest error.  Accordingly, we must now measure (estimate)
this error.  By definition, the error in each instance is the difference between the level of market
power we would infer in the market in question and whatever is our best estimate of market
power.15  Having measured the two errors, we may now determine which is smaller.  If it is the
error resulting from choosing the narrower market N, then N is the relevant market, and our
market power inference is that associated with N.  If the error is instead lower with the broader
market B, then B is our choice and we infer market power accordingly.
A moment’s reflection on the foregoing reveals the fundamental defect of the market
definition process that renders it always unnecessary and inferior to dispensing with it entirely:
In order to choose the best market, a necessary input is our best estimate of market power.  But
our best estimate of market power is, well, our best estimate.16  In sum, any coherent method of
choosing a relevant market must take, as a preexisting input, some best estimate of market
power.  So way don’t we just stop and declare victory, quitting while we are ahead?
17The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines advance a highly catholic approach toward the types of evidence
that will be considered.  HMG §2.1.
18Necessarily, that is, unless we make market power inferences that do not depend on which market we
choose, in which case it is obviously pointless to define markets.
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In advancing the foregoing argument, note that nothing has been said or needs to be said
about how this best estimate of market power is obtained or about how good the estimate is.  It
might in one case be developed with subtle econometric techniques applied to high-quality data,
in another by observing a natural experiment, in another by interviewing sophisticated
purchasers, and in yet another from firms’ internal documents.17  Most often, there will be a
combination of types of evidence of varying qualities.  In some cases, our estimate may
appropriately be viewed as a guesstimate.  Furthermore, the quality of the best estimate will
depend greatly on the procedural context:  As a preliminary screen by an agency deciding, say,
whether to solicit further information, the estimate will often be extremely crude; essentially, if it
seems almost certain that market power is negligible, the investigation will cease.  At the stage
of challenging a merger, the estimate may be much better, yet still quite imperfect.  And so forth.
The key point for present purposes is that, whatever is the stage, the nature of available
information, or its quality, decisionmakers need to make some estimate.  Their best estimate is
simply the best they can do under the circumstances.  Now, whatever is this best estimate, that is
what one would wish to use in choosing which market definition was better, N or B.  (One could
use some other estimate, but by definition, that would be inferior.)  Accordingly, regardless of
the quality of the estimate or the setting, it is always the case that the pertinent best estimate is a
necessary input to choosing the best market definition.  And since the only reason to define a
market is to make a market power inference, which by assumption one already has (and what one
has is best), why bother?
Unfortunately, matters are worse.  The reason is that the market power inference one
draws from the best market one can define is not the same as our best estimate; it is inferior. 
Recall our setup.  Even if we have succeeded in coming down to the two markets that give rise to
the most accurate market power inferences, we are in a situation where the inference from one
market (N) is too high and that from the other market (B) is too low.  If we chose the former, we
overestimate market power, relative to our best estimate.  If we choose the latter, we
underestimate market power, relative to our best estimate.  To be sure, if we make the right
choice, we will have chosen the lesser of two evils.  But our choice is still evil—specifically,
because a more virtuous choice was available: eschewing market definition altogether and
sticking with our best estimate.  That is, the market definition process necessarily entails
discarding information and substituting an inferior conclusion.18
In addition, employing a worse market power inference will sometimes lead to the wrong
legal conclusion.  Suppose that N is our choice.  In that instance, market power is overstated.  In
some cases—specifically, those in which the level of market power we infer is just above our
threshold for action whereas our best estimate is below this threshold—we will mistakenly
challenge or condemn behavior.  Similarly, when B is our choice, there will be cases in which we
mistakenly permit behavior that should have been challenged or condemned.  These undesirable
outcomes, it is now obvious, are both inevitable (with market definition) but entirely avoidable
19Actually, there is a way to avoid legal error while still employing market definition: making the choice of
the relevant market an ex post conclusion—after determining liability (whether to challenge or prohibit a
merger)—rather than an input to the conclusion.  That is, one can estimate market power and use that estimate to
determine the right legal outcome.  Then, after the outcome is determined, one can choose a market definition that is
consistent with the conclusion already reached.
20This lacuna permeates competition law throughout the world.  See Kaplow (2011).
21One reason for this omission may be that a wide range of levels of market power is consistent with given
HHI figures, even in properly defined markets, a point brought to life in examples in Landes and Posner (1981).  Of
course, this fact makes the use of the market definition process and stated HHI thresholds all the more dubious.
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(without market definition).19  Of course, employing our direct estimate directly does not
eliminate the possibility of error since our estimate is only that, an estimate.  But the expected
cost of error is minimized when we use our best estimates rather than employing knowingly
inferior alternatives.  With market definition, less is more, and the optimum is a corner solution:
none at all.
3 Uselessness of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test
3.1 Determinacy at the Expense of Coherence
In the current version of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines—as well as in previous
versions going back to the 1980s and in the merger guidelines in other jurisdictions—the market
definition / market share paradigm is instantiated by two mechanisms: the hypothetical
monopolist test, used to define the relevant market, and numerical levels of the postmerger HHI
and the merger-induced increment to the HHI, used to determine a level of danger that triggers
further analysis (bringing in other factors) and may provide a presumptive basis for an ultimate
challenge.  What is striking is that, although such guidelines tend to be explicit that the purpose
of most or all of the analysis is to estimate the competitive effects of mergers, there is no direct
statement of what competitive effects are necessary or sufficient for a challenge.20
To bring this point home, suppose that the merging parties’ and the government’s
separate analyses both concluded that a merger would elevate price on a sustained basis by 1.8%. 
Who wins?  Which is to say, does the government challenge or allow the merger, and if a court
faithfully followed the Guidelines, would the merger be enjoined or approved?  Looking at the
Guidelines, we simply do not know the answer.
This state of affairs should be regarded as both puzzling and problematic.  After all, the
entire purpose of the Guidelines’ analysis—including application of the hypothetical monopolist
test to define markets and other inquiries (directed, for example, at entry)—is to enable
predictions about how much the merger will elevate price (taken here for simplicity, as is often
true in the Guidelines themselves (HMG §1), as the unidimensional target).  Moreover, various
HHI thresholds are offered.  One might have imagined that they would have been chosen based
on the likely price effect associated with various HHI levels and increases brought about by a
merger.  But one would indeed be imagining, for such is never presented, either in the
Guidelines or in supporting analysis or policy statements.21  So, we have most of the Guidelines,
22There are important qualifications (respects in which this formula oversimplifies), as established in Farrell
and Shapiro (1990), but these problems are largely orthogonal to the present point.
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and the market definition component in particular, designed to answer a question—the predicted
price effects of a merger—but we would not know what to do with an answer if we had one.  In
this light, it is unclear how one can assess whether one or another version of the hypothetical
monopolist test, or any other market definition mechanism for that matter, is a sensible or silly
means of addressing the problem.
One way to offer a partial evaluation of an approach under such circumstances is to test it
for internal consistency.  To do so, we can consider some plain vanilla applications of the test,
that is, in basic situations in which various complications do not arise.  We might suppose that, at
a minimum, the test would yield consistent conclusions in such cases.  Specifically, if a merger is
condemned (actually, viewed as presumptively problematic) in one case, then surely in another
involving a greater price elevation, it would likewise be impermissible.  Similarly, if a merger
readily is allowed to go forward under certain assumptions, then if we change the case such that
price elevation would be even less, it should continue to be permissible.  Such, however, is not
the case.
As a first cut, consider some simple, rough comparisons involving Cournot (quantity)
competition with homogeneous goods, where the only concern is with unilateral market power. 
In case one, the hypothetical monopolist test is passed.  Indeed, such a firm would elevate prices
tremendously, by hundreds of percent, because the demand elasticity is so low—and we will
ignore supply responses for simplicity.  Nevertheless, as long as the postmerger HHI is
sufficiently low (now below 1500, HMG §5.3), the merger would not be seen to raise questions. 
This is true even though a merger could elevate price significantly, say, 20%, in such as case. 
(For any shares, as low as we like, we can find a low enough elasticity so that this result holds.) 
In case two, the hypothetical monopolist test again passes, but such a firm would elevate prices
only 5.1%.  Clearly, any merger, no matter how high the resulting HHI and increase in
HHI—indeed, even a merger to monopoly—cannot raise price more than 5.1%.  Hence, we
would condemn mergers that we know raise price less than 5.1% while allowing one that raises
price 20%.
One can readily generate other anomalies.  If the 5% test is barely met, then under HMG
§5.3 a merger that results in an HHI of more than 2500 and raises the HHI by more than 200 is
presumed likely to enhance market power.  A merger raising the HHI from 2301 to 2502 meets
that test.  To assess this case more explicitly, it is helpful to use the formula appearing, for
example, in Ordover, Sykes, and Willig (1982) and Kaplow and Shapiro (2007), which indicates
that the industry-wide average, output-weighted margin equals HHI/|gd| (where the HHI is
represented in ten-thousandths, so that its range is from 0 to 1).22  Therefore, the premerger
elevation would roughly equal 0.23 divided by the market elasticity of demand, whereas a
hypothetical monopolist, which we have supposed can raise price 5% over the prevailing level,
has a Lerner index equal to 1.0 divided by that elasticity.  These relationships are consistent with
an elasticity of approximately 15, a premerger elevation of about 1.49%, and a postmerger
elevation of approximately 1.62%, for a merger-induced elevation of 0.13%, that is, under two
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tenths of one percent.  By contrast, if the hypothetical monopolist can only raise price 4.9%, we
expand the market, and if the first set of substitutes involves far more revenue than does the
original market, then even a merger to monopoly would not trigger scrutiny, even though such
merger would raise price 4.9%, which is to say, over thirty-five times more than the preceding
merger that is presumptively condemned.
One could attempt to avoid this embarrassment by resort to other factors, but that is no
consolation.  After all, we can imagine cases in which they are inoperative—or in which they
have the same relative impact on our two scenarios, leaving the ordering unchanged.  Indeed, we
can imagine cases where, say, entry is a greater factor in lower-elevation cases, worsening the
comparison—unless entry is large enough to lead to exoneration there too, but of course, we
have no idea how strong it must be since we have no stated target anticompetitive effect.
One might instead object to employing different market elasticities of demand.  But such
differences are common and, indeed, the core purpose of the hypothetical monopolist test is to
address precisely the factor of demand substitution.  If it fails to do this very well, it is not clear
what purpose it serves.  To elaborate, we might imagine that, once we have a relevant market in
which the hypothetical monopolist test succeeds—i.e., once we have the narrowest market in
which the hypothetical monopolist can profitably elevate price at least 5%—we would inquire
further into the actual market elasticity of demand, and then use that elasticity to determine the
magnitude of the predicted price increase due to the merger.  Such analysis would be sensible
indeed.  But note that (a) it is necessary in all cases, in order to know whether we might
otherwise be condemning mergers with small price effects or allowing mergers with large ones,
and (b) once one goes this route, the hypothetical monopolist test is rendered moot.  That is, if
we are going to measure the demand elasticity directly and employ it to compute the price effect
directly, we do not need to bother defining the market, using the hypothetical monopolist test or
otherwise.  Accordingly, there is a dilemma:  Either the hypothetical monopolist test has
significant bite, in which case it often leads to senseless answers, or it does not.  One hopes the
latter, which is to say that the test in fact plays little or no real role in analyzing horizontal
mergers.
Consider now cases in which the hypothetical monopolist test fails in the first round,
which is to say that a hypothetical monopolist cannot profitably raise price 5% in the
homogeneous goods market.  Continuing with situations in which our concern is with unilateral
price elevation in a Cournot setting, we now have a maximum on the possible price increase for
our merging parties.  Indeed, using the above formula, we can at this point compute what the
price increase would be.  So why aren’t we done?  Specifically, suppose that we don’t stop and
instead follow the hypothetical monopolist test, expanding the market until we reach the point at
which the test is met.  What are we to do with the market shares in that market?  The shares in
the homogeneous goods market allow us—along with our demand elasticity estimate from the
first stage of the hypothetical monopolist test—to determine price elevation.  The shares in this
expanded, heterogeneous goods market do not allow us to do this.  (Note that this criticism is
very close to that raised in subsection 2.1.)  In other words, the hypothetical monopolist test
yields a so-called relevant market that is not relevant to anything.
23It is used more broadly as well, but such applications will not be addressed here.  Needless to say, given
the general critique of market definition in section 2 and the specific criticism of this test in subsection 3.1, as well as
the points developed here, broader consideration would indicate that it is not useful in any setting.
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3.2 Is the Hypothetical Monopolist Test Ever Useful?
The hypothetical monopolist test entered the competition policy scene through merger
guidelines and, as noted, is widely employed in that context.23  The foregoing analysis already
indicates that market definition is pointless, or worse, and that this test in particular has
additional flaws.  To round out the discussion and provide further concreteness, it is helpful to
review the three main settings in which the test is meant to be employed.
Beginning with unilateral effects and, in particular, the effect of a horizontal merger in a
market with homogeneous goods and Cournot (quantity) competition, we have already seen from
subsection 3.1 that the hypothetical monopolist test goes awry.  Consider again the formula
presented there under which the markup is given by the HHI divided by the market elasticity of
demand.  The first step in applying the test involves asking how much the hypothetical
monopolist would elevate price in the homogeneous goods market.  Whatever is that answer, it is
clear from the formula in subsection 2.1 that this result gives us gd, the market elasticity of
demand.  Indeed, this elasticity would be the basis for the price elevation estimate.  At this point,
we are indeed finished.  That is, given this elasticity and the postmerger HHI, we can determine
the postmerger price elevation.  And using instead the premerger HHI, we can determine the
premerger price elevation.  Subtracting, we have the price elevation due to the merger.  This
logic, note, has nothing to do with whether the hypothetical monopolist could or could not
elevate price by 5% or more in the homogeneous goods market.  And, if it cannot, the analysis
has nothing to do with which substitutes we add next, what the ultimate relevant market under
the hypothetical monopolist test turns out to be, or what the merging firms’ shares in that market
are.  We do not have any reason to find out.
Consider next unilateral effects with product differentiation.  Here, as is now familiar, the
way to predict the price elevation resulting from the merger is to determine the diversion ratio
between the firms’ products (suppose, for simplicity, that each sells only one) and use the levels
of the premerger markups for each to determine how much price will rise.  These ideas are long
familiar from critical loss analysis—e.g., Baker and Bresnahan (1985), Harris and Simons
(1989), O’Brien and Wickelgren (2003)—and have recently gained added attention due to
Farrell and Shapiro’s (2010) article.  No market definition is involved.
Can the hypothetical monopolist test nevertheless somehow be used to illuminate this
question?  Suppose that we start with some cluster of products, including at least the merging
firms’ two products.  If this market is drawn narrowly to include only those two products, then
the first stage of the hypothetical monopolist test replicates the foregoing.  In this market, the
merged firm is a monopolist.  As with unilateral market power in a homogeneous goods market,
however, there is no reason to proceed.  The first stage asks how much the hypothetical
monopolist can raise price.  At that point, we are done: in this case, instantly.  Now, if the
original market includes other products, the first stage would either indicate how much the
24This common view is supported by the fact that nearly all price-fixing prosecutions, which involve secret
communications, involve homogeneous goods.  See Connor (2007, pp. 136–53), Harrington (2006, pp. 98–102), and
Hay and Kelley (1974, pp. 29–38).  Since coordination with differentiated products is much harder, one would
assume that the need for explicit discussions would be greater, leading to a higher detection rate in such cases. 
Hence, the very low observed proportion in this sample suggests that coordination is quite infrequent in such
settings.  (It is possible that attempts are more frequent but not prosecuted because they fail, but since the concern in
reviewing mergers is with the prospect of realized anticompetitive effects, this possibility is not particularly
important.)
25Despite the statement in the preceding footnote, in some cases it might be imaginable that a merger would
facilitate coordinated price elevation involving different goods.  In such cases, it would be sensible to consider how
high prices would thus be elevated taking the two (or more) homogeneous goods markets in combination.  But the
purpose of the analysis would not be to choose one or another market, but rather to assess the particular concern. 
Relatedly, it would not matter whether or not the particular combination considered was the market that would be
chosen under the hypothetical monopolist test.
26It is sometimes suggested that the use of market definition—whether implemented via the hypothetical
monopolist test or otherwise—might, despite its limitations, be useful as a quick screen, especially to eliminate cases
in which the prospect of anticompetitive effects is clearly negligible.  This argument is likewise mistaken, although
not that mischievous.  It presupposes that one can somehow be sure that, say, a very broad market definition, in
which the merging firms’ shares are trivial, is obviously correct.  But such a conclusion would have to be grounded
in the view that the elasticity of demand for the merging firms’ products was very high.  At that point, as the
preceding text explains, our analysis would be complete.  Adding the conclusion that the proper market is some
particular broader market does not help, which follows directly from the analysis in subsection 2.2 indicating the
need for a best estimate of market power—which estimate may in some contexts be based on very limited
information—as a prerequisite to any market definition.  Also, quick, intuitive, broad market definitions can be
mistaken.  For example, in the Staples and Whole Foods mergers, regardless of what one ultimately thinks of the
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hypothetical monopolist of all the products could elevate all of the prices simultaneously—which
is the wrong question—or it would consider subcases, including those focusing on one or both of
the merging firms’ products, in isolation, which replicates the scenario in which we initially
consider the narrower market with only those two products.  As above, there is never any reason
to broaden the market and repeat the test.  Market definition in general, and the hypothetical
monopolist test for the relevant market in particular, is of no use in predicting the price effects of
a merger between firms that sell differentiated products.
Finally, consider the prospect of coordinated price elevation.  As a practical matter,
coordination tends to be plausible, if at all, in homogeneous goods markets (or ones that are
nearly homogeneous).24  In applying the hypothetical monopolist test, this is where one starts. 
And, in light of where the concern lies, this is where one should stop.  The measure of the price
elevation by such a monopolist would (roughly) equal the elevation that would be achieved by
perfect coordination.  This is another instance in which our first-step answer to the price
elevation question—stopping short of any market redefinition—tells us all that we need to
know.25  Again, there is no reason to contemplate market redefinition, using the hypothetical
monopolist test or otherwise.
Considering these three cases together, we can see that, in all relevant contexts, the
hypothetical monopolist test—and market definition more generally—has nothing to offer.  The
general lessons about market definition in section 2 and the particular criticisms of the
hypothetical monopolist test in subsection 3.1 are consistent with this conclusion, and the prior
analysis is suggestive of most of the specific points made here.26
merits, the narrow markets seemed obviously wrong to many, whereas direct assessment of market power suggested
that this may not have been true.
27For links to comments on the original questions issued by the DOJ and FTC in the Guidelines revision
process and, respectively, to comments on the proposed revision (which is close to the promulgated version), see
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/index.shtml, and
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/hmgrevisedguides/index.shtm.
28On the former, sharp criticism predates widespread use of the paradigm.  See Chamberlin (1950, pp.
86–87): “‘Industry’ or ‘commodity’ boundaries are a snare and a delusion—in the highest degree arbitrarily drawn,
and, wherever drawn, establishing at once wholly false implications both as to competition of substitutes within their
limits, which supposedly stops at their borders, and as to the possibility of ruling on the presence or absence of
oligopolistic forces by the simple device of counting the number of producers included.”  Regarding the latter, see
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A further observation is that the Guidelines themselves—which mostly consist of
motivations and explanations rather than mere statements of the mechanical test—and
surrounding commentary really do not address how it is thought that the hypothetical monopolist
test, or any means of defining markets, is useful.  This characterization seems apt regarding most
of the discussion of the test itself and of the particular applications to unilateral and coordinated
effects (HMG §§6, 7).  And commentary on the hypothetical monopolist test, whether praise or
criticism, likewise does not really attend to just how it is imagined that the resulting market
definition will be useful.
A related point is that criticisms of the revised Guidelines’ greater acceptance of
alternatives to market definition, in general or regarding particulars, are obscure in an important
respect.27  Most are grounded in the implicit assumption that defining markets, including through
use of the hypothetical monopolist test, is feasible and sensible, and that the resulting choice of a
relevant market and the market shares measured therein can be interpreted coherently, so as to
provide a more useful means of inferring market power—the predicted price elevation due to the
merger—than that given by the alternative under consideration.  All such criticism, on reflection,
should be viewed as deeply problematic, at least regarding the comparison.  To be sure, one or
another proposed method of predicting the competitive effects of mergers may sometimes, often,
or always be difficult and inferior to various other techniques.  The point of this article is that
market definition—in general and through the Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test—is not
one of them.  Put another way, the debate should shift from one about market definition versus
alternatives to a comparative assessment among those alternatives: all of them, or at least those
that continue to survive scrutiny.
4 Conclusion
The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines from the beginning embraced the market
definition / market share paradigm and in the 1980s put the hypothetical monopolist test on the
world stage, emulated by competition authorities around the globe.  The 2010 revisions contain a
handful of statements suggesting greater openness to alternatives and devote a modest portion of
the official text to mentioning a few.  Even ignoring the critique advanced in this article, one
could view this movement as tepid.  After all, economists, legal commentators, and courts have
long viewed the paradigm as having significant defects, and economists over the past twenty-five
years have devoted considerable energy toward developing alternatives.28  Against this
Whinston (2006) for a survey.
29Many would argue that this shift has been going on for a long time and that the Guidelines revision merely
ratifies this fact.  Indeed, one stated rationale for the revision emphasizes the need for the Guidelines to better reflect
current practice.
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background, it may seem surprising that the revisions do not go further in this direction.  Another
view would be that the new Guidelines’ modest statements launch the evolution of merger
review (further) down a slippery slope and therefore are dangerous, threatening to throw the
process and court scrutiny into disarray.  From this perspective, what matters less are the words
themselves; reading between the lines, a more momentous shift may be underway.29
This article offers an entirely different perspective.  The market definition / market share
paradigm is not merely clumsy and sometimes misleading.  Rather, it is entirely bankrupt.  As
section 2 explains, there is no economically justifiable way to infer market power from market
shares in redefined, heterogeneous goods markets—that is, without reversing the market
redefinition and returning to the homogeneous goods market where one began.  In addition, it
demonstrates that there is no way to determine whether one market definition is better than
another without first having a best estimate of market power in hand.  But in that event, why ever
bother to define markets rather than simply using that best estimate as one’s bottom line? 
Moreover, choosing a market and (somehow) inferring market power from shares in that market
results in a worse market power inference—worse, that is, than the best estimate with which one
started.  As a consequence, mistakes will be made, sometimes challenging or condemning
mergers that are benign according to one’s best estimate, and sometimes allowing mergers that
are detrimental given that best estimate.
Section 3 explains that the hypothetical monopolist test is no better and in some respects
worse.  It achieves determinacy at the expense of coherence.  In particular, it does not
consistently order cases by their relative danger, even in very simple settings.  Moreover,
consideration of each of the main merger scenarios in which the test is employed—unilateral
market power with homogeneous goods, unilateral market power with differentiated products,
and coordinated effects—reveals that there is never anything to be gained (aside from confusion
and erroneous results) from use of the hypothetical monopolist test.
As a purely conceptual matter, market definition should be abandoned entirely, both
across the board and, in particular, in merger analysis.  A related point is that these
deficiencies—which go to the core logic of the paradigm rather than presenting merely practical
concerns of varying weight in different cases—raise a significant question about current practice. 
For example, it was noted that there is no economically legitimate way to infer market power in
redefined markets, so how have economists, whether in agencies or testifying as experts in court,
been doing so for decades?  One could argue that any proffered expert’s market definition
testimony should be inadmissible (in U.S. federal courts, under the Daubert test) since the field
of economics offers no basis for such analysis, and, indeed, as demonstrated here, affirmatively
contraindicates its use.
It does not follow, however, that the agencies revising the U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines should be criticized for timidity.  Perhaps they should be; perhaps not.  Ultimately,
30“For example, evidence that a reduction in the number of significant rivals offering a group of products
causes prices for those products to rise significantly can itself establish that those products form a relevant market. 
Such evidence also may more directly predict the competitive effects of a merger, reducing the role of inferences
from market definition and market shares.”  HMG §4.  “The Agencies normally consider measures of market shares
and market concentration as part of their evaluation of competitive effects.  The Agencies evaluate market shares and
concentration in conjunction with other reasonably available and reliable evidence for the ultimate purpose of
determining whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.”  HMG §5.  Furthermore, Kühn (2002, p. 316)
suggests that the European Commission “appears to be open to the general trend of moving toward a practice of joint
determination of market definition and market power instead of insisting on a mechanical two-step exercise of
market definition and market share assessment.”
31Moreover, as Kaplow (2010, §VI.E) documents, U.S. courts are not so obviously wedded to market
definition as seems usually to be imagined.  In addition, mainstream legal commentators seem increasingly willing to
forgo market definition, at least for mergers in markets with differentiated products.  See Areeda and Hovenkamp
(2009, pp. 84–88).
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that judgment depends on pragmatic political considerations.  Had the revisions gone further,
much further, and entirely jettisoned the market definition / market share paradigm, along with
the hypothetical monopolist test, there may have been a backlash from lawyers, experts with
entrenched interests due to their experience using existing techniques, and courts that might have
been shocked by the sudden shift.  And such a reaction would have been counterproductive.  So,
instead, the drafters might have consciously chosen to proceed more slowly.
Nor is such gradualism an obvious constraint, for agencies or for the courts.  As the
Guidelines mention at various points, one may pursue traditional market definition and
alternatives of all sorts in parallel, allowing each to inform the other.30  That mixing of methods
may provide sufficient cover to give little or no weight to traditional market definition. 
Likewise, courts that find direct evidence of competitive effects convincing and that view
parties’ disputes about market definition to be metaphysical and unhelpful are free to decide as
they wish and to ratify their decisions through an essentially ex post choice of market definition. 
That is, if they wish to reject a merger because they believe that it is anticompetitive they
can—essentially for that reason—choose the narrow market definition, and conversely if they
believe the opposite.  Indeed, they are probably to some (unknown) extend doing so already.31
With regard to market definition, the 2010 revision to the U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines can be viewed as half empty or half full.  Only time will tell.  Eventually, “half” may
no longer be an apt characterization.
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